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Rethinking the PHOSITA in Patent Litigation
Greg Reilly*
This Article was prepared for the Loyola University Chicago Law
Journal’s Symposium “Decisions, Decisions: Exploring Factors that
Affect the Judicial Decision-Making Process.” It questions the trend in
Supreme Court cases and academic commentary toward greater reliance
in patent litigation on the hypothetical “person having ordinary skill in
the art” (“PHOSITA”)—essentially a person of average abilities in the
technical field of the invention. This trend reflects a desire to approach
as closely as possible the first-best outcome of accuracy to the technical
merits of patent disputes. But this first-best outcome is impossible given
the constraints imposed by lay decision makers. Long-standing
proposals to tailor patent litigation institutions to patent law’s technical
nature by increasing the technical competence of decision makers have
made little headway. If lay decision makers are here to stay, then the
optimal approach is to tailor patent law to the needs of these lay decision
makers, including by reducing and constraining the PHOSITA’s role.
Lay judges and jurors lack the knowledge, training, and experience to
reliably apply the PHOSITA’s perspective themselves. Therefore,
increased reliance on the PHOSITA equates with increased reliance on
expert witnesses, which introduces a host of well-recognized problems.
Attempting to approximate the theoretical ideal of technical fidelity
through the PHOSITA is misguided due to the errors introduced by the
expert witnesses necessitated by lay decision makers. Tailoring patent
law to the needs of lay decision makers—including more legalistic and
objective doctrines that reduce the role of the PHOSITA—may be optimal
in practice, even if second-best in theory.

* Assistant Professor of Law, IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. Thanks to the editors of the
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal for the invitation to participate in this symposium, as well
as my co-panelists Jonas Anderson, Daniel Klerman, Floyd Mandell, and Matthew Sag for a fruitful
discussion. Thanks also to Mark Rosen and David Schwartz for helpful discussions on this and
earlier versions of the project.
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INTRODUCTION
Patent litigation is a notoriously difficult area of law for federal district
judges. A judge assigned a patent case must wrestle with both an intricate
body of law and complex scientific concepts while managing a full
docket of other cases.1 Some federal judges love patent cases because
1. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1155, 1196–97 (2002).
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they are so challenging.2 Others loathe patent cases for this same reason.3
Regardless, patent cases are more difficult and complicated than most
other federal litigation. The Federal Judicial Center weighs a patent case
as the equivalent of nearly five ordinary cases—the fourth highest weight
of dozens of categories of federal litigation.4
The doctrinal design choices made in patent law further complicate
patent cases for judges.5 Decision makers must resolve many patent law
issues from the perspective of a “person having ordinary skill in the art”
(“PHOSITA”) (i.e., an average technical person in the relevant field).6
Judges cannot resolve patent cases based on their own understanding or
conclusions, or even those of a reasonable layperson.7 Rather, judges
must put themselves in the shoes of an expert in the field and resolve
patent law issues as an expert would.8 As generalists who rarely have
any scientific or technical training, “judges are at a rather serious
disadvantage in trying to put themselves in the shoes of an ordinarily
skilled scientist.”9 For that reason, “[t]he PHOSITA construct, rooted in
the scientific or technical, can be difficult for the courts to apply.” 10 One
federal judge compared the PHOSITA to “an inside joke that I’m not in

2. See, e.g., Allan Pusey, Marshall Law: Patent Lawyers Flock to East Texas Court for its
Expertise and “Rocket Docket”, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, March 26, 2006, at 1D (quoting Eastern
District of Texas Judge Ward stating that he “sought out patent cases” when he became a judge
because he “enjoyed the intellectual challenge”); Roy Strom, Judge Dread and Patent Law, CHI.
LAW. (May 1, 2015), http://www.chicagolawyermagazine.com/Archives/2015/05/Patent-LawCourt-System.aspx (quoting Northern District of Illinois Judge Holderman as stating “I love this
stuff” in reference to complex patent cases).
3. Kathleen M. O’Malley et al., A Panel Discussion: Claim Construction from the Perspective
of the District Judge, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 671, 682 (2004) (statement of Judge Saris) (“I
have heard trial judges claim that they dislike patent litigation, partly because it is hard.”); id. at
683 n.31 (“A lot of my colleagues hate patent cases. Hate them. They say, ‘I tell you what, if you
do my patent case, I’ll do five ERISA cases.’”).
4. PATRICIA LOMBARD & CAROL KRAFKA, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 2003–2004 DISTRICT COURT
CASE—WEIGHTING STUDY: FINAL REPORT TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL STATISTICS OF
THE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL RESOURCES OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
4 (2005), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/CaseWts0.pdf/$file/CaseWts0.pdf.
5. Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 13 (2010) (“While the subject
matter of patent cases is often technologically complex, patent doctrine itself renders this a
particularly difficult area of law to apply.”).
6. Timothy R. Holbrook, Patents, Presumptions, and Public Notice, 86 IND. L.J. 779, 781
(2011).
7. Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark A. Lemley, The Audience in Intellectual Property Infringement,
112 MICH. L. REV. 1251, 1282 (2014); Lee, supra note 5, at 12.
8. Fromer & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1282.
9. Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1196.
10. Holbrook, supra note 6, at 782.
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on.”11
Because lay judges do not personally have knowledge or experience to
resolve issues from the PHOSITA’s perspective, patent law’s reliance on
the PHOSITA necessitates judicial reliance on expert witnesses to opine
on the knowledge, skill, and understanding of experts in the field.12 In
the evidence scholarship and law and science literature, however,
commentators widely criticize expert witnesses as costly and biased in
favor of the party paying them. Commentators also worry about the
imperfect fit between law and science, as well as the ability of lay judges
and juries to evaluate expert evidence that is needed exactly because the
issues are outside the competency of lay people.13
Overall, “a century’s worth of writing about expert evidence circles
around the same themes and consistently reaches the same conclusion:
that the use of party selected expert witnesses in an adversarial legal
system is fraught with difficulties.”14 These problems are equally
applicable to patent litigation. As far back as 1894, United States
Supreme Court Justice David Brewer proposed in the pages of the Yale
Law Journal “prohibit[ing] all expert testimony in patent cases” because
“[t]hey are expensive” and “[t]heir testimony [always] supports the party
who calls them.”15
This background makes the trend in patent law in recent years toward
greater reliance on the PHOSITA quite surprising. A consequence of the
Supreme Court’s increased engagement with patent law over the past
decade has been expanding the role of the PHOSITA by introducing the
concept into new areas of patent law, placing greater emphasis on the
PHOSITA where it was already used, assigning more tasks to the
PHOSITA, and placing less constraints on the PHOSITA.16
Commentators have largely supported the Supreme Court’s expansion of
the PHOSITA perspective, with some suggesting an even greater role for
the PHOSITA beyond that already adopted by the Supreme Court.17
11. Strom, supra note 2 (quoting Professor David Schwartz recounting this anecdote).
12. See infra Part II.A (discussing the relationship of the PHOSITA and expert witnesses).
13. See infra Part II.B (describing the several well-recognized problems with experts in patent
litigation).
14. Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence, Partisanship, and Epistemic Competence, 73
BROOK. L. REV. 587, 588 (2008).
15. D.J. Brewer, The Patent System, 3 YALE L.J. 149, 155–56 (1894).
16. See infra Part I.B.1 (discussing the Supreme Court’s expansion of PHOSITA over the last
ten years).
17. See infra Part I.B.2 (noting that academic commentary is generally in line with the Supreme
Court’s increased emphasis on the PHOSITA in patent litigation).
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To some extent, this trend ignores that greater reliance on the
PHOSITA necessarily means greater reliance on expert witnesses—and
the problems they cause. Or, worse, some in the patent community
glorify expert witnesses as protecting against lay judges and juries
bungling patent cases.18 More sophisticated observers recognize the
downside of greater reliance on the PHOSITA, and therefore expert
witnesses, but still largely endorse this trend in patent law.19 They
emphasize the importance of accuracy in terms of the technical merits of
patent cases, believing that, despite its shortcomings, the PHOSITA
perspective will optimize fidelity to the technical merits.20 In essence,
these commentators assume that even if lay decision makers prevent the
patent system from achieving the ideal of perfect technical fidelity, the
best outcome is to approach this first-best state as closely as possible by
using the PHOSITA’s perspective.
Economic principles suggest, however, that when a first-best outcome
is impossible because of some constraint—in this case, lay decision
makers—the second-best outcome is not necessarily to approach the firstbest outcome as closely as possible.21 Doing so can introduce more
problems, such as the costs, bias, and inaccuracy that accompany expert
witnesses. Rather, a second-best outcome might require a different
approach that fully accounts for the constraints (i.e., lay decision makers)
that prevent achievement of the first-best outcome.22 Viewed in this
light, the trend toward greater reliance on the PHOSITA seems like an
ill-advised effort to approximate the first-best outcome of technical
fidelity.
Those advocating greater reliance on the PHOSITA
underestimate the constraints imposed by lay decision makers.
If the ideal outcome of the patent system is perfect technical fidelity,
and lay decision makers hinder this outcome, the obvious solution is to
remove or minimize lay decision makers. Proposals to increase the
technical competence of decision makers abound in patent litigation,
including: the use of court-appointed experts, technical advisors, or
18. See infra Part II.C (noting that when laypersons are confronted with technical information
there is a risk that they will overrely on expert testimony).
19. See infra Part II.C (discussing that some commentators see expert witnesses as a necessary
evil).
20. See infra Part II.C (describing the concerns surrounding the use of the POSHITA
perspective and suggestions for mitigating those concerns).
21. See infra Part II.C (hypothesizing that the increasing reliance on the PHOSITA in patent
litigation is an example of incomplete first-best theorizing).
22. See infra Part II.C (discussing why it might be necessary to change variables to achieve a
second-best state of affairs).
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special masters; the use of specialized judges and juries with technical
training; and the shifting of more decision making to the comparative
experts in the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Over a
century’s worth of experience with similar proposals in the law and
science literature, and at least decades of experience in patent litigation,
suggests that these proposals will have, at best, a limited impact.23
If lay decision makers are here to stay in patent litigation, the secondbest outcome might be to tailor the doctrines applied in patent litigation
to reflect the capabilities of those decision makers. This Article proposes
some design principles for doing so: replacing technical doctrines heavily
dependent on the PHOSITA with more legalistic doctrines; eliminating
the PHOSITA from some areas of patent law; making the PHOSITA’s
role narrower and more constrained; and increasing the objectivity of
patent law doctrines.24 To be clear, these proposals are for patent
litigation. The same considerations are not necessarily warranted for the
technically trained decision makers in the Patent Office. Other work has
suggested the need to decouple patent law and apply different rules,
standards, and tests tailored to the different contexts and decision makers
of patent litigation in the courts and patent acquisition in the Patent
Office.25
Consistent with the theme of the Loyola University Chicago Law
Journal’s Symposium, “Decisions, Decisions: Exploring Factors that
Affect the Judicial Decision-Making Process,” this Article focuses
primarily on the difficulties the PHOSITA perspective creates for district
judges. Of course, the decision makers in patent litigation are both lay
judges and lay juries. Because the problems that lay judges and lay juries
face relating to the scientific and technical issues are largely the same,26
this Article treats discussions of the issues for judges and juries as
interchangeable. With that said, the problems for district judges have a
greater impact in patent litigation, as judges make far more decisions than
juries do. Only 2.8 percent of patent cases reach trial27—29 percent of

23. See infra Part III.A (discussing reasons why the history of patent litigation suggests that the
proposals will not succeed).
24. See infra Part III.B (discussing the possible design of a second-best approach to patent law
tailored to the capabilities of lay decision makers).
25. Greg Reilly, Decoupling Patent Law, 97 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at
1), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2854375.
26. Lee, supra note 5, at 16–17.
27. Mark A. Lemley, Where to File Your Patent Case, 38 AIPLA Q.J. 401, 411–13 (2010)
(analyzing districts with twenty-five or more outcomes).

11_REILLY_DOCUMENT6.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

Rethinking the PHOSITA

2/10/2017 2:18 PM

507

which are bench trials.28 By contrast, 3.3 percent of patent cases are
resolved by a judge on summary judgment,29 much less the vast number
of patent cases in which the judge denies summary judgment or grants it
in part in a nondispositive way. And even jury trials require the judge to
be equally engaged in the technical issues to resolve the admissibility of
expert testimony (i.e., Daubert motions), make evidentiary rulings, and
resolve motions for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial.30
Part I surveys the role of the PHOSITA in patent litigation, including
the recent increase in emphasis in Supreme Court decisions and academic
commentary. Part II discusses the problems the PHOSITA introduces
into patent litigation due to the need for expert testimony. Part III
considers possible solutions.
I. THE PHOSITA AND PATENT LITIGATION
Reliance on the technical perspective of the “person having ordinary
skill in the art,” or “PHOSITA,” pervades patent law. After a period of
relative de-emphasis, the PHOSITA has seen a resurgence in recent years,
with cases assigning the PHOSITA an even greater role. The resurgence
of the PHOSITA reflects a sense in the patent community that patent law
had strayed from the technical aspects of patents in favor of more
legalistic and formalistic approaches. Many commentators believe that
greater reliance on the PHOSITA will make patent law a better fit for its
technical subject.
A. The PHOSITA in Patent Litigation
Patent law relies heavily on “the measurement of some legal parameter
against the skill and knowledge of the PHOSITA,” or “person having
ordinary skill in the art.”31 “In almost every area of patent law, the court
or jury should view the issues from the perspective of the PHOSITA, not
that of a lawyer or layperson.”32
The PHOSITA is roughly someone with common skill level in the
technical field of the invention.33 But the PHOSITA is not an actual

28. John R. Allison et al., Understanding the Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, 92 TEX. L.
REV. 1769, 1779 (2014).
29. Daniel M. Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 312 (2016).
30. See Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444, 1470 (2010) (describing
the role of district judges in patent cases).
31. Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1187.
32. Holbrook, supra note 6, at 781.
33. Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1189.
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person and does not reflect the knowledge or abilities of any actual realworld individual.34 Like “reasonable person” standards in other areas of
law, the PHOSITA is a legal construct not dependent on the subjective
knowledge or abilities of any given person, such as the inventor.35
The PHOSITA’s “ubiquitous” presence in patent law is justified on
several grounds.36 First, as a formalist matter, the patent statute explicitly
requires some decisions to be made based on the conclusion that would
be reached by “a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the
claimed invention pertains.”37 Second, and more functionally, the
PHOSITA arguably allows entitlement to a patent to turn on an objective
legal baseline, rather than varying depending on the actual abilities of the
inventor.38 Third, reliance on the PHOSITA is said to be necessary to
reflect the dual nature of patent documents and doctrines as both legal
and technical. While the lawyers and judges that dominate the patent
system are capable of evaluating the legal aspects on their own, the
PHOSITA perspective provides a mechanism by which they can account
for the technical nature of patents.39 Fourth, and relatedly, reliance on
the PHOSITA is said to avoid the necessity of having judges, juries, or
other decision makers who are personally trained in the field of the
invention.40 Finally, the use of the PHOSITA arguably provides needed
flexibility to patent law—which is generally uniform across technical
area—by allowing some measure of tailoring or adjusting of patent law
doctrines to specific technical contexts.41
But reliance on the PHOSITA in patent litigation also creates
problems. Because the use of the PHOSITA requires more direct
engagement with the technical nature of patents, it is more difficult for
lay decision makers to apply, raising both decision and error costs.42 By
contrast, the PHOSITA standard is more reliably applied during patent
examination, where the decision makers are technically trained patent
examiners.43 These patent examiners are more likely, than lay judges or
34. Id. at 1187.
35. Id. at 1187–89.
36. Holbrook, supra note 6, at 781.
37. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2011) (describing how to make a proper determination of obviousness);
see also 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2015) (describing a similar test for patent disclosure).
38. Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1187–89.
39. Holbrook, supra note 6, at 781.
40. Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1187–89.
41. Id. at 1191.
42. Holbrook, supra note 6, at 807; Reilly, supra note 25 (manuscript at 34).
43. Reilly, supra note 25 (manuscript at 46).
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juries, to approach the knowledge and abilities of the PHOSITA, or at
least have a better informed basis on which to evaluate evidence
presented on this issue.44
B. The Recent Resurgence of the PHOSITA in Patent Litigation
Although the PHOSITA has long been a part of patent law, there is a
recent trend to reinvigorate the PHOSITA’s prominence.45 This trend is
apparent both in recent Supreme Court cases and in an increasing amount
of academic commentary.46 The trend has taken various forms, including
an expansion into areas of patent law from which the PHOSITA was
previously absent, an increased emphasis on the PHOSITA in areas
where it was only formally present, an expansion in the tasks assigned to
the PHOSITA, and a removal of constraints on the PHOSITA’s
perspective.
1. The Supreme Court’s Expansion of the PHOSITA’s Role
The Supreme Court’s increased engagement with patent law over the
past ten years has been a prime contributor to the reinvigoration of the
PHOSITA. In KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., the Supreme Court
significantly expanded the role of the PHOSITA in determining whether
an invention is invalid as “obvious,” that is, too trivial an advance over
what already existed to warrant a patent.47 A key question in making this
determination is whether an invention that combines existing components
in a new way is obvious. Prior to KSR, the Federal Circuit required that
the prior art (i.e., existing knowledge in the field) provide some teaching,
suggestion, or motivation to combine, often requiring that this be explicit
in a written prior art reference.48 Although this determination was made
from the PHOSITA’s perspective, the task assigned to the hypothetical
PHOSITA was minimal: simply reading the prior art references to
identify any statement that would provide a reason to combine the prior
art elements.49 Under this framework, the PHOSITA has been described
“as a bit of a ‘dullard,’ aware of the art but devoid of creativity or
44. Id.
45. Holbrook, supra note 6, at 808.
46. See infra Parts II.B.1–2 (evaluating the PHOSITA in the context of problems with reliance
on expert witnesses).
47. KSR Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421–22 (2007).
48. Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Realistic Approach to the Obviousness of Inventions,
50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 989, 994–95 (2008).
49. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Obvious to Whom? Evaluating Inventions from the Perspective of
PHOSITA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 885, 889 (2004).
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inventive skills.”50
KSR adopted a more flexible and open-ended approach to obviousness
that considered a wider variety of factors, including the “interrelated
teachings of multiple patents; the effects of demands known to the design
community or present in the marketplace; and the background knowledge
possessed by a person having ordinary skill in the art.”51 KSR expanded
the role of the PHOSITA in the obviousness determination, treating the
PHOSITA “as someone who solves problems by applying a reasonable
amount of ingenuity” and allowing obviousness to be based on the
PHOSITA’s “ordinary creativity in solving known problems,” not just
explicit “suggestions or motivations to combine existing references.”52
The result is a “resuscitation” and “invigoration of the PHOSITA in this
context” that arguably “suggests that the Court disagrees with the Federal
Circuit’s broader efforts to remove or minimize her knowledge from
other patent law doctrines.”53
In Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., the Supreme Court
likewise emphasized the importance of the PHOSITA’s perspective in
claim construction—the interpretation of the short paragraphs at the end
of the patent that define the patentee’s exclusive rights. 54 A longstanding precept of claim construction is that patent claim terms must be
given “the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill
in the art in question at the time of the invention.”55 Despite the
PHOSITA’s formal role in claim construction, it had a limited functional
impact. Federal Circuit cases virtually never discussed the PHOSITA
and often favored intrinsic evidence from the patent document itself over
extrinsic evidence about the PHOSITA’s background knowledge and
understanding.56
In holding that the Federal Circuit must defer to the district court on
the evidentiary underpinnings of claim construction, Teva seemed to
emphasize the PHOSITA’s background knowledge and understanding
more than the Federal Circuit case law.57 The Court suggested that claim
50. Durie & Lemley, supra note 48, at 1001.
51. KSR, 550 U.S. 398 at 1740–41.
52. Durie & Lemley, supra note 48, at 1001–02.
53. Holbrook, supra note 6, at 811; see also Durie & Lemley, supra note 48, at 1001 (noting
“the role of the PHOSITA will expand” after KSR).
54. 135 S. Ct. 831, 841, 851 (2015).
55. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
56. J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: A Historical, Empirical, and
Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 43–48, 55–56 (2013).
57. See, e.g., Dennis Crouch, Teva v. Sandoz: Partial Deference in Claim Construction,
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construction might require “look[ing] beyond the patent’s intrinsic
evidence . . . to consult extrinsic evidence in order to understand, for
example, the background science or the meaning of a term in the relevant
art during the relevant time period.”58 Some have concluded that the
Court endorsed an approach to claim construction that begins by
determining the “meaning to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the
time of the invention” and only then looks at the intrinsic evidence from
the patent to determine if the PHOSITA “would ascribe that same
meaning to that term in the context of the specific patent claim under
review.”59
Finally, in Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., the Supreme Court
introduced the PHOSITA’s perspective into an area of patent law in
which it had been essentially dormant.60 Under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b),
patent claims must be “definite” to insure adequate public notice of the
patent rights and therefore must “particularly point[] out and distinctly
claim[] the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards
as the invention.”61 Prior to Nautilus, the Federal Circuit held that claims
were indefinite only if they were not “amenable to construction” or
“insolubly ambiguous”; claims were sufficiently definite as long as a
“court c[ould] ascribe some meaning to a patent’s claims.”62
Because this test depended on claim construction, and claim
construction was judged from the PHOSITA’s perspective, this test was
not completely divorced from the PHOSITA. But the Federal Circuit’s
approach depended on the perspective and abilities of “a court viewing
matters post hoc,” not “the understanding of a skilled artisan at the time
of the patent application.”63 Nautilus rested the definiteness doctrine
squarely on the PHOSITA’s shoulders, “hold[ing] that a patent is invalid
for indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the specification
delineating the patent, and the prosecution history, fail to inform, with
reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the

PATENTLYO (Jan. 20, 2015), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/01/partial-deferenceconstruction.html (suggesting that after Teva there is likely to be greater emphasis on extrinsic
evidence of the PHOSITA’s understanding at the time of the invention).
58. Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 841.
59. Id.; see also Jason Rantanen, Teva, Nautilus, and Change Without Change, 18 STAN. TECH.
L. REV. 375, 392 (2015) (interpreting Teva as endorsing this approach).
60. 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014).
61. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b).
62. Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2130.
63. Id.
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invention.”64
2. Academic Support for the Expansion of the PHOSITA’s Role
The academic commentary is generally in line with the Supreme
Court’s increased emphasis on the PHOSITA in patent litigation.
Leading commentators have applauded KSR’s expanded role for the
PHOSITA in obviousness.65 Likewise, commentators both before66 and
after67 Teva have encouraged greater use of the PHOSITA’s perspective
in claim construction. And the Court’s emphasis on the PHOSITA in
indefiniteness has also been favorably received by academics.68
More generally, Professor Tim Holbrook has criticized existing
doctrines as “result[ing] in an over-discounting of the views of
technologists, as represented in the PHOSITA.”69 Holbrook argues for
greater “opportunity for the views of the PHOSITA to be considered” in
patent law.70 Holbrook and others have called for greater reliance on the
PHOSITA in determining whether a patent claims patent-eligible subject
matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101,71 whether a patent enables a person in the
64. Id. at 2124 (emphasis added).
65. See, e.g., Durie & Lemley, supra note 48, at 1003 (“As a general matter, we think the
increased focus on a real-world, creative PHOSITA is a salutary development.”); see also
Holbrook, supra note 6, at 810–11 (describing favorably “[t]he Supreme Court’s resuscitation of
the PHOSITA” in KSR); Sean B. Seymour, Heightened Enablement in the Unpredictable Arts, 56
UCLA L. REV. 127, 134–35 (2008) (describing favorably that “the post-KSR PHOSITA is not a
plodder but a creative individual”).
66. See, e.g., J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: A Historical, Empirical,
and Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 43–48, 55–56 (2013)
(advocating for “greater emphasis on skilled artisans, inventors, patent attorneys, and patent agents
in tracing the drafting of patent claim terms and their understanding to skilled artisans in the context
of the particular patent”); Kristen Osenga, Linguistics and Patent Claim Construction, 38 RUTGERS
L.J. 61, 101–02 (2006) (arguing that the PHOSITA should be the focus of claim construction).
67. See Crouch, supra note 57 (suggesting greater use of extrinsic evidence to reflect PHOSITA
perspective).
68. See J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Restoring the Fact/Law Distinction in Patent
Claim Construction, 109 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 187, 199–200 (2015) (describing favorably the
increased need for consultation of PHOSITA’s understanding after Nautilus).
69. Holbrook, supra note 6, at 784; see also Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking
Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1644 (2007) (“[T]here is a growing
sense among court watchers and patent players that the Federal Circuit has fallen out of rhythm
with some of the technological communities its decisions affect because the court has retreated into
its own legal formalisms at the expense of gaining a good understanding of industrial and
technological needs.”).
70. Holbrook, supra note 6, at 783.
71. Timothy R. Holbrook & Mark D. Janis, Patent-Eligible Processes: An Audience
Perspective, 17 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 349, 363 (2015) (noting critically that “patent law’s most
common trope, the hypothetical person having ordinary skill in the art, has been accorded no place
in the Supreme Court’s modern eligibility cases”).
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field to make and use the invention under 35 U.S.C. § 112,72 and whether
the patent provides a written description showing that the inventor
possessed the claimed invention under 35 U.S.C. § 112.73
C. Understanding the PHOSITA’s Resurgence
The renewed emphasis on the PHOSITA, both in Supreme Court cases
and the academic commentary, is a direct result of dissatisfaction with
the Federal Circuit’s stewardship of patent law. Commentators have
criticized the Federal Circuit’s de-emphasis of the PHOSITA in claim
construction for rendering the interpretation of patent claims overly
legalistic and divorced from their technological context.74 Similarly,
commentators have praised KSR’s increased emphasis on the PHOSITA
as an appropriate response to the Federal Circuit’s “too-rigid application
of rules designed to prevent hindsight bias [that] had led to a number of
results that defied common sense.”75
More generally, the Federal Circuit has been accused of “discount[ing]
the role of the PHOSITA” and “attempt[ing] to speak the death of the
PHOSITA” because it “view[s] patents as merely legal, not technical,
texts.”76 “To effect this approach, the court has articulated a variety of
formalistic legal rules that are far more accessible to a layperson but
minimize the importance of the patent’s technical component.”77
Criticism of the Federal Circuit’s de-emphasis of the PHOSITA is
consistent with the more general trend of blaming problems with the
patent system on the Federal Circuit, particularly “its overly formalistic
rule-based adjudication in patent cases.”78 The Federal Circuit’s
penchant for formalistic and legalistic rules in patent cases has been
variably explained as reflecting an overemphasis on the importance of

72. Holbrook, supra note 6, at 792 (criticizing as “particularly egregious” the fact that “the
Federal Circuit has removed considerations of the PHOSITA from assessing the sufficiency of
patent disclosures under the written description and enablement doctrines”).
73. Holbrook & Janis, supra note 71, at 115 (arguing that “a far more robust incarnation of the
PHOSITA is needed” in written description); see also Holbrook, supra note 6, at 792 (criticizing
as “particularly egregious” the fact that “the Federal Circuit has removed considerations of the
PHOSITA from assessing the sufficiency of patent disclosures under the written description and
enablement doctrines”).
74. Holbrook, supra note 6, at 791.
75. Durie & Lemley, supra note 48, at 991.
76. Holbrook, supra note 6, at 782.
77. Id. at 783.
78. David O. Taylor, Formalism and Antiformalism in Patent Law Adjudication: Rules and
Standards, 46 CONN. L. REV. 415, 419–20 (2013) (describing, but not endorsing, criticism).
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uniformity in patent law;79 an overemphasis on the public notice function
of the patent document;80 or an effort to “reduce[] the degree to which
lay judges must engage with technological subject matter.”81 It has been
criticized for elevating these other values over the technical aspects of the
patent document82 and minimizing the importance of “gaining a good
understanding of industrial and technological needs.”83
The Federal Circuit’s approach does have its defenders, even if they
represent the minority view. For example, Professor Peter Lee has
suggested that the Federal Circuit’s formalism provides heuristics that
allow lay judges to reduce the information costs of parsing complex
technology.84 Similarly, Professor David Taylor has argued that “rulebased adjudication may seem appropriate for decision making by juries
and some judges in patent cases, at least to the extent these cases involve
highly complex, technical subject matter” beyond the lay decision
makers’ background understanding.85
On the whole, however, the Federal Circuit’s preference for
formalistic, legal rules has been criticized for overemphasizing other
values, such as public notice, uniformity, and ease of application, and
underemphasizing the importance of accuracy in terms of fidelity to the
technical merits of the invention.86 Specifically, the Federal Circuit’s deemphasis of the PHOSITA is said to undermine technically accurate
outcomes by treating what is a mixed legal and technical document as
purely legal.87 At its core, the recent trend in patent law to increase the
role of a PHOSITA reflects a desire to improve the accuracy of patent
adjudication vis-à-vis the technical merits.88
79. Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Percolation, Uniformity, and Coherent Adjudication: The Federal
Circuit Experience, 66 SMU L. REV. 505, 512 (2013).
80. Holbrook, supra note 6, at 808 (contending that the de-emphasis of the PHOSITA “ignores
that documents do contain technical aspects to them, and that the representations made in them as
a technical matter may not have the same import that the courts are affording them as a legal
matter”).
81. Lee, supra note 5, at 7.
82. Holbrook, supra note 6, at 782–83.
83. Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 NW.
U. L. REV. 1619, 1644 (2007).
84. Lee, supra note 5, at 41.
85. Taylor, supra note 78, at 483.
86. Dreyfuss, supra note 79, at 509, 519; see also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal
Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 8 (1989) (characterizing
“accuracy” in patent law as reflecting “the needs of inventors” and “the practicalities of technology
development”).
87. Holbrook, supra note 6, at 808.
88. Durie & Lemley, supra note 48, at 1003 (“Applied properly, a PHOSITA-based approach
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II. THE PHOSITA PROBLEM IN PATENT LITIGATION
There is a core problem with widespread reliance on the PHOSITA in
patent law: the American patent system relies on lay judges and juries to
decide patent disputes. These decision makers must decide the case as a
PHOSITA would, not as the judges or jurors themselves would.89
“Within the judicial system . . . no one is truly a PHOSITA.”90 Therefore,
reliance on the PHOSITA requires that “the fact finder channel the beliefs
of someone whose expertise they do not usually possess.” 91 “[I]t is
difficult for the non-scientific district court judge, with limited experience
in patent cases, to put himself into the shoes of an ordinary scientist.”92
This difficulty casts serious doubt on the trend toward greater reliance
on the PHOSITA in patent law.93 Lay decision makers must rely on
external evidence of the knowledge and abilities of the PHOSITA,
primarily expert testimony plagued by a series of problems well
recognized in the evidence literature. Patent scholars who recognize this
problem tend to treat it as inevitable, assuming that patent law must
approach as closely as possible the technically sound decision a
PHOSITA would make. To the contrary, if an ideal or first-best state is
impossible—such as perfect technical fidelity in light of the lay decision
makers in patent litigation—the best response is not always to approach
the first-best state as closely as possible. Rather, a second-best solution
that better reflects actual conditions might be preferable.
A. The Relationship of the PHOSITA and Expert Witnesses
Because the decision makers in patent litigation are lay judges and
jurors, not experts in the relevant field, technical “[e]xpertise is always
external.”94 Thus, extrinsic evidence “typically is the manner by which
the views of the PHOSITA enter the calculus” in patent litigation.95
to obviousness will point courts toward the ‘right’ answer . . . .”).
89. Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 713 F.2d 693, 697 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
90. Holbrook, supra note 6, at 781–82. Even most of the judges of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit, which has nationwide appellate jurisdiction in patent cases, lack technical
training. Id.
91. Fromer & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1282.
92. Kristen Osenga, Linguistics and Patent Claim Construction, 38 RUTGERS U. L.J. 61, 102–
03 (2006); see also Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1196 (“[J]udges are at a rather serious
disadvantage in trying to put themselves in the shoes of an ordinarily skilled scientist.”).
93. See Fromer & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1283 (suggesting studies showing “individuals
generally struggle to model people dissimilar from themselves . . . cast some doubt on how well
lay fact finders can model experts (i.e., PHOSITAs) as the audience in IP infringement”).
94. Michael Burstein, Rules for Patenting, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1747, 1788 (2011).
95. Holbrook, supra note 6, at 815.
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This extrinsic evidence sometimes takes the form of expert resources
like textbooks, scientific journal articles, or technical dictionaries
published contemporaneously with the invention.96 But most typically,
it is testimony by expert witnesses created specifically and solely for the
pending litigation.97 This is unsurprising. Contemporaneous texts are
unlikely to directly address the relevant questions in dispute in the
litigation, such as whether this particular invention would have been
obvious to a PHOSITA or whether this particular patent enabled a
PHOSITA to make and use the invention. Rather, the parties must
commission expert witnesses to study, report on, and testify about these
precise questions. Thus, greater reliance on the PHOSITA’s perspective
necessarily equates with “greater reliance on expert testimony regarding
what those of skill in the art would have known and been capable of
developing.”98
Expert witnesses already play a prominent role in patent litigation.
Although “the Federal Circuit has not articulated a per se rule that expert
opinion testimony is required,” it has concluded that “expert testimony is
‘typically’ necessary in patent cases involving complex technology.” 99
In some patent cases, a court might regard the absence of expert
testimony as a failure of proof.100 As a result, patent litigation almost
always involves expert witnesses testifying on technical issues.101
Indeed, “[i]t is axiomatic that technical experts are virtually a sine qua
non for patent litigation.”102 Beyond being common, expert witnesses
are normally the most important witnesses in patent cases.103 Patent
96. Fromer & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1282; see also Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303,
1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“Because dictionaries, and especially technical dictionaries,
endeavor to collect the accepted meanings of terms used in various fields of science and technology,
those resources have been properly recognized as among the many tools that can assist the court in
determining the meaning of particular terminology to those of skill in the art of the invention.”).
97. Fromer & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1267; Holbrook, supra note 6, at 815.
98. Durie & Lemley, supra note 48, at 1001 (making this observation in the context of
obviousness).
99. James Ware, Patent Rules of Evidence, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
749, 757 (2007); see also FED. R. EVID. 701 (prohibiting testimony from nonexperts if the
testimony is based on “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of
Rule 702”).
100. Id.
101. John P. Fry, Helping Clients Navigate the Unfamiliar Waters of Patent Litigation, in
PATENT LITIGATION AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION 39, 47 (Aspatore ed., 2007).
102. Edward G. Poplawski, Selection and Use of Experts in Patent Cases, 9 FED. CIR. B.J. 145,
145 (1999).
103. Richard A. Cederoth, Preparing for Patent Litigation, in PATENT LITIGATION AND
DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 101, at 106.
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cases often devolve into a battle of the experts, with very few fact
witnesses and a number of competing expert witnesses. 104 The recent
trend toward increased reliance on the PHOSITA will exacerbate the
expert-centric nature of patent litigation.
B. The Problem with Expert Witnesses
In other areas of law, expert evidence has been seen as “problematic
from just about the moment of its invention” and “criticized for a
remarkably long time.”105 Even more positive evaluations of expert
evidence only contend that the problems are not as extreme as is
frequently claimed or that there is no other viable option.106 They do not
deny the existence of several well-recognized problems with experts in
litigation generally, problems that are equally present (or even more
severe) in patent litigation.
The most obvious problem with expert witnesses is that they raise the
direct costs of litigation.107 The experts themselves are paid, normally
quite handsomely.108 The extensive involvement of the hiring attorney
in the expert’s preparation, report, and testimony increases the costs, as
virtually every minute of expert time is matched by a minute of attorney
time and, of course, time is money.109 Commentators evaluating patent
litigation specifically have noted the high costs resulting from its heavy
reliance on expert witnesses.110 The increased direct costs that stem from
expert witnesses are particularly worrisome in patent litigation, which
suffers from disproportionately higher litigation costs than other areas of
104. See Anthony J. Fitzpatrick, Winning Patent Cases in a Challenging Legal Environment, in
LITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CASES: LEADING LAWYERS ON
ADAPTING TO NEW TRENDS, IMPROVING COURTROOM TACTICS, AND UNDERSTANDING THE
IMPACT OF RECENT DECISIONS 91, 98 (Aspatore rev. ed. 2011) (providing a representative example
of a recent “trial where each side had five experts, and there was only one fact/non-expert witness
who was called to testify in the courtroom”); Ware, supra note 99, at 757 (noting that expert
witnesses “play important roles in all aspects of patent litigation” but that “[p]atent trials are not
characterized by large numbers of [lay or fact] witnesses” and most patent issues require “the
testimony of a small number of [fact or lay] witnesses”).
105. Mnookin, supra note 14, at 1009.
106. Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113, 1115.
107. See Jeffrey L. Harrison, Reconceptualizing the Expert Witness: Social Costs, Current
Controls and Proposed Reforms, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 253, 260 (2001) (noting that the use of experts
can raise the cost of litigation).
108. Gross, supra note 106, at 1138.
109. Id. at 1138–47.
110. Peter J. Curtin, Securing and Enforcing Patent Rights, in PATENT LITIGATION AND
DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 101, at 119–20 (“The fees and costs associated with expert
witnesses are often a significant piece of the total cost of the [patent] litigation.”).
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law.111
Even if the use of expert witnesses raises litigation costs for the parties,
it could reduce total decision costs if it simplifies matters for the decision
maker—but this is doubtful. Each party will offer testimony from experts
that “will be used to oppose each other with the effect of canceling each
other out. . . . If together the testimony does little or nothing to move the
jurors closer to the truth, there is a net loss—resources expended with no
advancement in the ‘truth-seeking’ objective.”112 Moreover, as discussed
in more detail below, it is difficult for lay decision makers to evaluate
expert testimony on subjects that are beyond their knowledge and
experience (and therefore require expert testimony in the first place).113
To the extent the use of expert witnesses reduces decision costs for
decision makers, it is likely because they are resolving the case based on
proxies—like the demeanor or testifying ability of the expert—rather
than the actual substance or merits.114
This raises a major concern with expert evidence. An increase in
decision costs might be warranted if expert witnesses improve the
accuracy of resolution and thereby reduce error costs. But commentators
have identified several reasons to be skeptical of whether litigation
experts actually reduce error costs.
1. Adversarial Bias
A core concern with the ability of expert witnesses to increase accuracy
and reduce error costs is that expert witnesses in American litigation are
generally selected, presented, and paid by one of the parties to the
litigation. Parties have the incentive to hire experts who will increase the
party’s chance of winning, not provide the most accurate testimony.
What a particular party views as the greatest value for its dollar—
effective expert testimony that persuades the factfinder—will often not
be commensurate with what a more systemic perspective would see as
most valuable, which would presumably be careful, accurate expert
testimony rather than testimony most persuasive to a nonexpert.115

Thus, the use of experts that are called and paid by one party creates an
111. Greg Reilly, Linking Patent Reform and Civil Litigation Reform, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 179,
197–98 (2015).
112. Harrison, supra note 107, at 263–64.
113. See infra Part II.B.2 (describing how laypeople lack the sufficient expertise to determine
bias among expert witnesses).
114. See supra text accompanying note 112 (recognizing the potential that experts could reduce
decision costs).
115. Mnookin, supra note 14, at 1011.
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inherent danger of bias.116
This adversarial or partisan bias can come in at least four forms. First,
expert witnesses might be consciously biased and “literally offer
themselves for hire, selling their opinions and their credentials to anyone
who meets their price.”117 The fact that attorneys have the ability to shop
from a pool of expert witnesses inevitably results in the risk that an expert
witness will be a consciously biased “hired gun.118 Second, the expert
witness might suffer from an unconscious bias by siding with, and
slanting one’s testimony in favor of, the hiring party.119
Third, expert testimony is shaded by “selection bias” that results from
the fact that the expert was specifically retained and hired by a party not
to present an objective view and represent a random sample of expert
opinions, but rather to present the view of the party that hired the
expert.120 “An expert witness need not have any previous contact with a
case” and normally “any minimally qualified practitioner of the expert
discipline at issue is eligible to testify,” which gives “the parties
unparalleled power to select their witnesses from a large pool, and to do
so on the basis of the content and the manner of their testimony.”121
Fourth, partisan bias is likely to cause experts to state their conclusions
with a higher degree of certainty than is warranted (e.g., “is” or “is not,”
rather than “probably is not” or “might be”), as lawyers “encourage their
expert witnesses to talk in strong, unambiguous terms and . . . choose
those experts who are likely to do so anyway or [are] willing to take
direction.”122
The problems of adversarial or partisan bias are equally as applicable
to patent litigation as other areas. Court-appointed or neutral experts are
rarely used in patent litigation,123 meaning that experts are almost always
selected and paid by the parties.

116. Id. at 1010.
117. Id. at 1011–12; see also David E. Bernstein, Expert Witnesses, Adversarial Bias, and the
(Partial) Failure of the Daubert Revolution, 93 IOWA L. REV. 451, 455 (2008) (explaining how it
is difficult for opposing counsel to discredit an expert witness paid for testimony).
118. Bernstein, supra note 117, at 454–55.
119. Mnookin, supra note 14, at 1011–12.
120. Bernstein, supra note 117, at 456.
121. Gross, supra note 106, at 1127–28.
122. Jennifer L. Mnookin & Samuel R. Gross, Expert Information and Expert Evidence: A
Preliminary Taxonomy, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 141, 187 (2003).
123. Poplawski, supra note 102, at 183; Strom, supra note 2.

11_REILLY_DOCUMENT6.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

520

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

2/10/2017 2:18 PM

[Vol. 48

2. Lay People Judging Expert Evidence
Use of expert witnesses also presents an “essential paradox”: parties
call expert witnesses to testify and present opinions about matters beyond
the ordinary understanding of lay people, and then the legal system
requires lay judges and jurors to evaluate the experts’ testimony.124 But
how can lay judges and jurors accurately judge the experts’ opinions, or
even expertise in the field, if the matters are beyond their knowledge and
understanding?125 And because lay judges and juries lack the necessary
expertise, one cannot expect them to accurately evaluate partisan bias.126
To be sure, expert witnesses do not offer a conclusion or opinion alone
but instead identify evidence and reasoning on which that opinion is
based. But because that evidence and reasoning will tend to be highly
technical and rely on background assumptions—beyond the knowledge
of lay decision makers—judges and juries will, at best, have an
incomplete understanding of the basis for the conclusion or opinion.127
“Even to know what evidence is relevant to a claim, after all, let alone to
judge how strong or how weak that evidence is, requires substantive
knowledge of the subject-matter.”128 This problem is particularly acute
with subjective expert testimony that is “based solely on an expert’s
experience and training,” not any objective basis.129 As a result of
experts’ use of subjective criteria and the lack of objective criteria, it is
extremely difficult for lay judges and juries to evaluate experts with
similar credentials and “ascertain whether the proffered expert has
applied his experience reliably to the facts of the case or whether the
expert is a hired gun or an outlier.”130
The result is that instead of evaluating expert testimony on its merits
or substance, lay judges and juries are left to rely on secondary criteria
like demeanor, credentials, and superficial explanatory plausibility. 131
Further, these criteria do not correlate with technical merit or accurate
results because attorneys can, and do, shop for experts that will best
satisfy these criteria and be most appealing to judges and jurors.132 As a
124. Gross, supra note 106, at 1182.
125. Mnookin, supra note 14, at 1014.
126. Id.
127. Susan Haack, The Expert Witness: Lessons from the U.S. Experience, 28 HUMANA.MENTE
39, 44 (2015).
128. Id.
129. Bernstein, supra note 117, at 480.
130. Id. at 486.
131. Mnookin, supra note 14, at 1013.
132. Gross, supra note 106, at 1133; Mnookin, supra note 14, at 1013.
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result, the hired experts will not necessarily have the most knowledge or
expertise of the issues in dispute.133 In fact, the opposite is often true. A
party that chooses the best experts in the field is “stuck with whatever
limitations of manner and background those people possess,” and leading
experts are unlikely to have the time or inclination to spend time learning
“the techniques of effective presentation.”134 By contrast, those who
make their living as expert witnesses, rather than by actually working in
the field, have both the incentive and the ability to devote time “to
perfecting their courtroom demeanor.”135
Again, the problem with lay judges and jurors evaluating the testimony
of expert witnesses is just as much a problem in patent litigation as other
areas. Commentators have recognized that “an expert’s credibility and
other characteristics unrelated to the expert’s technical analysis” are
likely to have a greater impact than “the actual quality of the expert’s
technical analysis” because lay decision makers “are ill-equipped to
evaluate technical matters” or resolve “contradicting technical
evaluations . . . [that] often involve fine distinctions.”136 Indeed, much
of the expert testimony in patent litigation is of the most problematic type:
subjective testimony based just on experience and training, not any
objective basis. Subjective questions abound, such as whether a
PHOSITA would find a particular patent obvious in light of existing
knowledge; whether the patent disclosure is sufficient to enable a
PHOSITA to make and use the invention; or what meaning a PHOSITA
would ascribe to a term as it is used in a particular patent. These are not
questions that can be tested or objectively verified. Rather, the expert
subjectively offers an opinion based on his or her knowledge, experience,
and training in the field.
3. Litigation’s Distortion of Science
A third related problem with expert witnesses arises from the fact that
law and science are an imperfect fit.137 The needs of litigation distort the
way in which science is presented by expert witnesses. This problem
manifests itself in several ways.
First, uncertainty is often the best scientific answer (e.g., it is likely or
133. Mnookin, supra note 14, at 1011.
134. Gross, supra note 106, at 1134.
135. Id.
136. Laura Hall, Technical Experts in Patent Trials: A Psychological Perspective, 39 AIPLA
Q.J. 195, 197–98 (2011).
137. Robert A. Bohrer, The Fundamental Difference Between Science and Law, in EXPERT
WITNESSING: EXPLAINING AND UNDERSTANDING SCIENCE 41, 41–49 (Carl Meyer ed., 1999).
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we do not know).138 By contrast,
[c]onfidence and certainty are traits that lawyers seek when they choose
experts—and traits they try to instill as they prepare them for trial. . . .
Worse, in many cases substantive rules of law require expert witnesses
to phrase their testimony in terms of a specified level of confidence.139

As a result, a core problem with expert testimony “is that experts claim
as matters of fact or probability opinions that should be couched in more
cautious terms, as possibilities or hypotheses.”140
Second, science focuses on general questions, whereas law seeks
particular, individualistic answers. For example, the province of science
is to say that one in one thousand people taking a drug will have an
adverse reaction, not to identify which person will have the adverse
reaction.141 By contrast, in law, one needs to know whether this specific
person has been harmed by the drug.142
Third, and relatedly, there often will not be existing scientific research
or knowledge that will meet the needs of the case, either because the case
presents a new scientific question (e.g., does this substance cause
cancer?) or because the case demands an answer specific to the facts of
the case.143 As a result, “scientific expertise is produced in response to
litigation,” and “science’s normal processes of validation [(e.g., peer
review)] can be bypassed or distorted.”144
The distortions to science resulting from the imperfect fit with
litigation are equally applicable in patent litigation. Because patent
litigation requires answers about the specific patent at issue, there is
unlikely to be significant existing expertise on the questions to be
answered, like whether the patent is obvious or would enable someone to
make and use the invention. Rather, scientific expertise must be created
for the specific litigation. And patent law demands definite answers—
the patent is either obvious or not obvious or enabled or not enabled—
rather than accepting hypotheses or probabilities.
C. The PHOSITA and the Theory of the Second Best
When viewed through the lens of the well-recognized problems with
expert witnesses, patent law’s renewed emphasis on the PHOSITA is
138. Mnookin & Gross, supra note 122, at 186.
139. Id. at 189.
140. Id. at 143.
141. Bohrer, supra note 137, at 48–49.
142. Id.
143. SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICA
50 (1995).
144. Id. at 51.

11_REILLY_DOCUMENT6.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

Rethinking the PHOSITA

2/10/2017 2:18 PM

523

surprising. Greater reliance on the PHOSITA equates with greater
reliance on expert witnesses, and expert witnesses are highly problematic
in litigation. So why would courts and commentators advocate increasing
the PHOSITA’s role in patent litigation?
To some extent, the answer is that the patent community does not have
the same concerns about expert witnesses as in other areas of law. Rather
than the necessary evil that they are seen as generally, expert witnesses
are sometimes described as essential protectors of the patent system,
serving to prevent generalist judges and juries from bungling patent
cases.145 For example, the Federal Circuit has explained that expert
witness are “[t]he foil to judicial hindsight” in evaluating the obviousness
of a patent.146
Yet, even those patent commentators that recognize the problems
introduced by expert witnesses still support greater reliance on the
PHOSITA in patent litigation. For example, Professors Fromer and
Lemley acknowledge that the use of an expert, or PHOSITA, perspective
in patent litigation “presents difficult second-order issues” for lay
decision makers because the need for expert witnesses presents “the usual
concerns about the reliability of the evidence, a possible battle of the
experts, and the ability of laypeople to process this evidence.”147 Though
Professors Fromer and Lemley are generally supportive of the expert, or
PHOSITA, perspective they suggest potential ways to mitigate the
concerns related to expert witnesses.148 Similarly, Professor Holbrook
notes that when laypersons confront technical information and issues,
there is a risk that they will over-rely on expert testimony.149 But
Professor Holbrook strongly criticizes the Federal Circuit’s de-emphasis
of the PHOSITA and encourages greater focus on the PHOSITA in patent
litigation, though he suggests that using presumptions might address
145. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1197 (suggesting, without critical analysis, that
“[e]xpert witnesses can help” lay judges learn difficult science); Hall, supra note 136, at 196–97
(“Technical expert witnesses play an important role in educating jurors on the relevant technical
matter so that the jurors may rightly decide the case.”); R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Did
Phillips Change Anything? Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction
Jurisprudence, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 123, 145 (Shyamkrishna
Balganesh ed., 2013) (advocating an approach to claim construction where “the knowledge of
technologists [i.e., experts] determines meaning” and leaves judges and lawyers to simply
“implement and execute the interpretive procedure”).
146. Outside the Box Innovations, LLC v. Travel Caddy, Inc., 695 F.3d 1285, 1297 (Fed. Cir.
2012).
147. Fromer & Lemley, supra note 7, at 1280–84, 1286–88.
148. Id.
149. Holbrook, supra note 6, at 815.
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concerns with experts.150
This Article’s hypothesis, loosely drawing on the economic theory of
the second best, is that the increasing reliance on the PHOSITA in patent
litigation is an example of incomplete first-best theorizing.151 A firstbest state of affairs is “the most desirable state the whole system could
assume” under ideal conditions.152 Commentators agree that a first-best
patent system would fully incorporate and reflect the technical nature and
audience of patents.153 The ability to achieve a first-best state of affairs
depends, however, on numerous variables—all of which must be in their
individual first-best state in order for the system to achieve the first-best
outcome.154 Often, one or more variables will not be capable of reaching
its first-best state, preventing achievement of the first-best outcome.155
The patent system’s ability to achieve its first-best state of accurately
reflecting the technical nature and audience of patents is constrained by
the nature of the decision makers—lay judges and juries who generally
lack the necessary scientific background.156
But what should result if lay decision makers in patent litigation make
it impossible to achieve the first-best state of perfect fidelity to patent
law’s technical nature and audience? The patent community’s response
is essentially to try to approach the first-best state of technical fidelity as
closely as possible through increased use of the PHOSITA, despite the
problems with expert witnesses that it creates. Indeed, the PHOSITA
perspective has been justified as having “the practical effect of avoiding
the requirement that judges and other arbiters of patentability be experts
in a given field.”157 Essentially, if lay decision makers prevent perfect
technical fidelity, then reliance on the PHOSITA moves the system as
close as possible.
The theory of the second best casts doubt on this approach. If one
150. Id. at 815–25.
151. Cf. ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF
LEGAL INTERPRETATION 80–81 (2006) (describing pervasive first-best theorizing in statutory
interpretation and need for second-best theories that account for institutional shortcomings).
152. Lawrence B. Solum, Constitutional Possibilities, 83 IND. L.J. 307, 311 (2008).
153. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1196–97 (describing the “right” outcome as one that
reflects the understanding of a scientist); Holbrook, supra note 6, at 807 (criticizing doctrines that
ignore the technical nature of patents).
154. Solum, supra note 152, at 311.
155. Id.
156. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1196 (“[J]udges are at a rather serious disadvantage
in trying to put themselves in the shoes of an ordinarily skilled scientist.”).
157. Id. at 1188; see also Holbrook, supra note 6, at 784 (“[T]he reliance on the PHOSITA is
necessary given the nature of the patent document, which has both legal and technical aspects.”).
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variable necessary to achieve a first-best state of affairs is constrained, it
might be necessary to change other variables in order to achieve a secondbest state of affairs.158 Keeping all of the other variables the same,
despite the constrained variable, might produce a worse outcome than
changing variables other than just the constrained variable. Put
differently, and more specifically, “if an imperfect judge knows that he
[or she] will fall short of the standard of perfection defined by the reigning
first-best accounts of [the law], it is by no means clear that he [or she]
should attempt to approximate or approach that standard as closely as
possible.”159
Patent law’s experience with the PHOSITA perspective provides a
strong practical example of this theoretical account. The constrained
variable of lay decision makers in patent litigation makes it impossible to
achieve the first-best state of perfect technical fidelity. The patent system
attempts to approach this first-best state as closely as possible by using
the PHOSITA mechanism. But use of the PHOSITA introduces the wellrecognized problems of cost, bias, and inaccuracy associated with expert
witnesses. Thus, attempting to come as close as possible to the first-best
state of technical fidelity may be backfiring, producing a worse outcome
than seeking a second-best outcome in light of the constraints imposed
by lay decision makers in patent litigation.
III. OPTIMIZING PATENT LITIGATION
In the previous Parts, this Article argued that the trend toward greater
reliance on the PHOSITA in patent litigation is problematic because it
attempts to replicate as closely as possible the first-best outcome of
technical fidelity—even though the ability to achieve this first-best state
is constrained by the lay decision makers used in patent litigation. This
Part turns to the consequence of this observation for the patent system.
Part III explores two possibilities. First, perhaps the constraint that
prevents achievement of the first-best state of technical fidelity, namely,
lay decision makers, should be removed. But frequent proposals along
these lines have gained little traction. If lay decision makers are here to
stay, then the second option is to adjust patent law doctrines to achieve a
second-best outcome that reflects the actual capabilities of lay decision
makers.

158. Solum, supra note 152, at 311.
159. VERMEULE, supra note 151, at 81 (analyzing statutory interpretation).
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A. Toward a First-Best Outcome?: Technical Decision Makers
If the ideal outcome is accurate resolution of the technical merits of
patent cases, then perhaps steps should be taken to increase the chances
of technical fidelity. And if lay decision makers are the primary
constraint on technical fidelity, then maybe the solution is to replace lay
decision makers with expert decision makers.
Proposals abound to increase the technical competency of decision
makers in patent litigation. The most common proposals are to use courtappointed expert witnesses, technical advisors, or special masters.160 But
use of court-appointed experts, technical advisors, and masters has gained
little traction in patent litigation.161 Patent litigation’s experience is
consistent with that in litigation more generally. At least since Learned
Hand suggested the idea in 1901,162 most scholars who have confronted
the problems introduced by expert witnesses have proposed the use of
independent or court-appointed experts.163 And yet “[j]udges simply do
not do it, and attempts to change that fact have been uniformly
ineffective.”164
In part, this is because the use of court-appointed experts and technical
adjuncts is inconsistent with the adversarial litigation system, “where the
adversaries are in charge of every other aspect of the preparation and
presentation of evidence.”165 Moreover, while court-appointed experts
might solve the problem of adversarial or partisan bias, they do not
address other problems presented by expert witnesses. Court-appointed
experts bring their own preconceived notions or biases about the

160. See, e.g., Josh Hartman & Rachel Krevans, Counsel Courts Keep: Judicial Reliance on
Special Masters, Court-Appointed Experts, and Technical Advisors in Patent Cases, 14 SEDONA
CONF. J. 61, 72–74 (2013) (discussing the risks and benefits of court-appointed witnesses, technical
advisors, and masters); David Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim
Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 261 (2008) (noting several
possible solutions to overcoming knowledge deficiencies in patent cases, including using special
masters and other experts and a radical option of employing judges with technical expertise); Strom,
supra note 2 (quoting Professor Dan Burk who stated: “[I]f judges are willing to use tools they
otherwise don’t use, like independent experts, the [patent] statutre can work a lot better”).
161. Poplawski, supra note 102, at 183.
162. Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15
HARV. L. REV. 40, 56–58 (1901).
163. See Gross, supra note 106, at 1220 (“The logic of this procedure [of court-appointed
experts] is so strong, in the abstract, that it invariably surfaces in every discussion of the issue.”).
164. Id.; see also Mnookin & Gross, supra note 122, at 148 (“We systematically neglect wellconsidered plans for the use of unbiased (or at least, non-partisan) expert testimony as a supplement
to potentially biased party-sponsored expert evidence.”).
165. Gross, supra note 106, at 1221.
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issues166—a problem that is especially great in areas where there is a
legitimate range of scientific opinions on a matter.167 Court-appointed
experts also do not address the problems of the imperfect fit between
science and litigation or the difficulty lay decision makers have in
evaluating expert testimony. If anything, court-appointed experts
exacerbate the latter problem because lay judges or juries may abdicate
their responsibility to decide cases themselves and simply defer to the
opinions of independent experts, technical advisors, or special masters.168
If court-appointed experts and adjuncts do not help lay decision makers
achieve technical fidelity, then perhaps the only alternative is to abandon
lay decision makers all together. Commentators have proposed shifting
patent litigation to specialized courts with technically trained judges169
or using specialized (or “blue-ribbon”) juries with technically skilled
jurors.170 Again, patent litigation is not unique in this regard, as similar
proposals have been made in other areas where science and law
intersect.171 And, again, these proposals have made little headway due
to concerns about inconsistency with foundational aspects of the
American jury system and practical difficulties related to identifying the
appropriate level of expertise, finding decision makers that meet this
level, and overburdening certain types of experts frequently needed in
court.172 The practical difficulties of such proposals are readily apparent
in patent litigation, where what is needed is not a decision maker with
any technical background, but instead a decision maker with the specific
technical background of the technology at issue.173
166. Haack, supra note 127, at 66–67.
167. See Mnookin, supra note 14, at 604–05 (noting that legitimate differences of opinion are
common in science).
168. See Gross, supra note 106, at 1221 (discussing this problem in the context of courtappointed experts); Mnookin, supra note 14, at 605 (discussing this problem in the context of
neutral experts); see also Hartman & Krevans, supra note 160, at 72–74 (recognizing that the same
problems exist with special masters and technical advisors as court-appointed experts).
169. See, e.g., Fromer, supra note 30, at 1472–73 (discussing and critiquing such proposals);
Schwartz, supra note 160, at 261 (emphasizing the discussion and critique of such proposals).
170. See Joshua L. Sohn, Specialized Juries for Patent Cases: An Empirical Proposal, 18 U.
PA. J. BUS. L. 1175, 1177 (2016) (advocating for specialized juries with scientific training in patent
cases).
171. See, e.g., Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 107
YALE L.J. 1535, 1681 (1998) (“The only solution . . . I see requires . . . a scientifically trained
judge or juror or agency administrator, the same person who has legal authority must also have
epistemic competence in relevant scientific disciplines.”); Mnookin, supra note 14, at 606–11
(analyzing such proposals).
172. See Mnookin, supra note 14, at 606–11 (analyzing such proposals).
173. See Fromer, supra note 30, at 1479 (“Specialized patent trial courts hearing cases involving
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An alternative to increasing the technical competency of courts in
patent litigation is to shift more decision making in patent cases to the
body that already possesses technical competency: the Patent Office.
Unlike proposals to increase technical skill in the courts, efforts to shift
more decision making to the comparative experts in the Patent Office
have proven fruitful. The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011174
introduced a variety of post-issuance procedures in the Patent Office that
greatly increased the ability of litigants to challenge the validity of patents
in the Patent Office instead of (or in addition to) courts.175 These new
procedures were motivated, in significant part, by the desire to raise the
level of technical skill in patent decision making. 176 This Article
generally supports this shift of more decision making to the Patent Office.
If the first-best outcome is accuracy in terms of the technical merits of a
patent case, then the comparative experts in the Patent Office are better
suited to achieve that outcome than the generalist judges and juries in
federal courts.
Yet, the shift of decision making to the Patent Office is incomplete,
with the various post-issuance procedures limited, such as by time after
the patent grant, grounds of invalidity, and sources of information
considered.177 Even this limited shift of decision making from courts to
the Patent Office has proven controversial, leading to complaints about
the number of patents invalidated and the constitutionality of the
procedures.178
In sum, history suggests that efforts to enhance the technical capacity
of decision makers in patent litigation are unlikely to succeed due to a
combination of historical, practical, cultural, and efficacy reasons. To a
limited extent, there has been a shift of some decision making to the
comparative experts in the Patent Office. Yet, “unless we are prepared
to make fundamental modifications to our adversarial system,” lay
disparate industries and technologies would not be as helpful as their advocates suggest.”); Lee,
supra note 5, at 18 (“[A] judge trained in biotechnology might know very little about computer
science.”); Schwartz, supra note 160, at 261 n.175 (“Because patents are issued for all different
technologies, judges could be assigned to disputes based upon technological experience.”).
174. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
175. Saurabh Vishnubhakat et al., Strategic Decision Making in Dual PTAB and District Court
Proceedings, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 45, 48 (2016).
176. Id. at 54–56.
177. Sarah Tran, Patent Powers, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 609, 631–39 (2012) (summarizing new
procedures).
178. Brief for New York Intellectual Prop. Ass’n as Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party,
MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 812 F.3d 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S.
Ct. 292 (2016). (No. 15-1330).
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decision makers will continue to resolve patent disputes.179 The
constraint lay decision makers impose on the patent system’s ability to
achieve the first-best outcome of accuracy to the technical merits of
patent disputes is here to stay.
B. Toward a Second-Best Outcome: Tailoring Patent Law to Lay
Decision Makers
Most proposals aimed at addressing the problems created by lay
decision makers in patent litigation are like those discussed previously,
seeking to bend litigation institutions to the needs of patent law by
increasing the technical expertise in patent litigation.180 But if those are
unlikely to succeed for the reasons discussed, then an alternative is to
bend patent law to the needs of the institutions and craft doctrines tailored
to the capabilities of lay decision makers.181
Put another way, if the first-best outcome of technical fidelity is
unachievable because of lay decision makers, then efforts to approach it
as closely as possible by expanding the emphasis and role of the
PHOSITA may be misguided. Rather, perhaps patent doctrines should
be designed to achieve a second-best outcome that is actually possible in
light of the capabilities of lay decision makers. To that end, Part III.B.
offers some preliminary thoughts on the design of a second-best approach
to patent law tailored to the capabilities of lay decision makers.
1. Legalistic Doctrines for Patent Litigation
Commentators criticize the Federal Circuit for adopting formalistic
and legalistic doctrines that “transform[] the patent inappropriately into a
purely legal document, when in fact that patent is a blend of the technical
and the legal.”182 For example, many Federal Circuit decisions
emphasize a legalistic approach to claim construction that focuses on
parsing the language of the patent itself—a similar task to other forms of
document interpretation that even uses similar canons—and deemphasize a more technical evaluation of extrinsic evidence detailing the
179. See Mnookin, supra note 14, at 606–11 (discussing this issue in the context of litigation
generally).
180. See supra Part III.A (discussing the use of technical decision makers in place of lay
witnesses).
181. Lee, supra note 5, at 6 (“[N]o matter how elegantly policymakers craft patent law, if
generalist judges lack the capacity to administer it, the patent system cannot fulfill its objectives.”);
cf. VERMEULE, supra note 151, at 36 (arguing in context of statutory interpretation that “[t]heorists
should design their proposals in light of the capacities of the implementing institutions”).
182. Holbrook, supra note 6, at 782–83.
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state of the art and general understanding of technical people in the
field.183
Similarly, the Federal Circuit’s pre-KSR approach to
obviousness emphasized a legalistic parsing of written prior art
documents to identify an express statement that would provide a
motivation to combine references, rather than the more open-ended and
technical evaluation adopted in KSR.184
The criticism is misplaced. Even if fidelity to the technical aspects of
patents is a first-best outcome, it does not mean that we should design
doctrines that require lay judges to approach this outcome as closely as
possible. Critics of the Federal Circuit’s approach acknowledge that its
legalistic rules “are far more accessible to a layperson” and that “the focus
on the more legal, intrinsic evidence would be favored by those trained
in the law and not necessarily in the sciences.”185 Thus, these legalistic
doctrines are well suited to the legally, but not technically, trained judges
that must decide patent cases. As such, they might be a second-best
outcome that reflects the constraints imposed on the patent system by lay
decision makers in patent litigation. Asking lay decision makers to apply
more technically intensive doctrines that more closely approximate the
first-best outcome of technical fidelity—such as those relying heavily on
the PHOSITA—might lead to worse outcomes because of the costs and
inaccuracies introduced by expert witnesses.
Professor Peter Lee has made a similar argument that is generally in
line with the discussion here. According to Professor Lee, the Federal
Circuit’s formalistic approach (which largely overlaps with its preference
for legalistic doctrines) “decreas[es] the extent to which lay judges must
engage technologically challenging subject matter,” thereby “lower[ing]
the cognitive burdens associated with lay adjudication of technological
disputes.”186 This reduces information costs for lay judges, avoiding the
need for them to use simplifying tools like analogies or excessive
deference to expert authority that undermine the accuracy of their
resolution of more technically-intensive inquiries.187 The problems
introduced by the expert witnesses that are necessitated by more
technically focused doctrines, like those relying heavily on the
183. Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 145, at 144–45 (criticizing the overly legalistic nature
of claim construction).
184. Durie & Lemley, supra note 48, at 991 (stating that the Court in KSR sought “to make the
obviousness determination less of a legal construct and to put more weight on the factual
determination of what scientists would actually think and do about a particular invention”).
185. Holbrook, supra note 6, at 782–83, 790.
186. Lee, supra note 5, at 25–29.
187. Id. at 20–25.
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PHOSITA, offer further support for the use of a more legalistic approach
to patent law in patent litigation.
On this view, the problem with the Federal Circuit’s approach to patent
law is not necessarily its legalistic or formalistic patent law doctrines. It
might be that it chooses the wrong legalistic or formalistic doctrines, for
example, by adopting consistently pro-patentee doctrines that have
unduly expanded the scope of patent rights.188 Prior work has suggested
another problem: the Federal Circuit’s legalistic rules apply not just to
patent litigation, where they can be justified in light of the needs of lay
decision makers, but also to patent acquisition in the Patent Office, where
they make a lot less sense given the presence of technically skilled
decision makers.189 This suggests decoupling patent law, so that rules,
standards, tests, and the like can be tailored for the different contexts and
decision makers of patent litigation in the courts and patent acquisition in
the Patent Office.190 This decoupling could include the use of more
legalistic tests better suited for lay decision makers in the courts and more
technical tests better suited for technically, but not legally, trained
decision makers in the Patent Office.191
2. Partially Eliminating the PHOSITA
The PHOSITA is pervasive in patent law, found in virtually all
doctrines.192 But is this warranted? As a formalist matter, the
PHOSITA’s perspective is only statutorily required in two areas of patent
law: obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103 and enablement under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112(a).193
Functionally, the primary role of the PHOSITA is to fill “the gap
188. Id. at 44–46 (describing this view).
189. Reilly, supra note 25 (manuscript at 46–49).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Holbrook, supra note 6, at 781.
193. Commentators have suggested that the statute requires the PHOSITA perspective not just
for enablement, but also for the closely related doctrine that the inventor provide a written
description of its invention, also found in Section 112(a). See Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at
1186 (explaining how PHOSITA’s parallel language sets the measures for several related disclosure
doctrines); see also Holbrook, supra note 6, at 792 (noting that the trend of elevating disclosure
over the knowledge of PHOSITA comes from emphasizing the written description of an invention).
This is inconsistent with the reading of the relevant statutory provision adopted by the en banc
Federal Circuit, which attributed Section 112’s reference to a “person skilled in the art” only to the
enablement requirement. See Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1343–45 (Fed.
Cir. 2010) (en banc) (determining that the language in Section 112 modifies only the written
description requirement). The Federal Circuit also adopted the PHOSITA perspective for written
description, apparently as a matter of common law. Id. at 1351.
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between the skill of ordinary practitioners and the written record” of the
patent and prior art.194 For some doctrines, this gap-filling function is
vitally important. For example, if a patentee had to provide every single
detail to enable someone to make and use the invention, no matter how
trivial or well-known, the patent document would quickly become
unwieldy, undermining its public notice function.195 Supplementing the
patent document’s disclosure with the PHOSITA’s background
knowledge avoids this problem. Similarly, permitting patentees to obtain
a patent on anything that was not exactly present in the prior art—no
matter how trivial the difference—would create a variety of problems,
including unduly rewarding the first to patent for inventions that would
been developed without the incentive of a patent. This would undermine
incentives for follow-on innovation and increase costs due to a flood of
applications on trivial inventions.196 Permitting the explicit disclosure of
the prior art to be supplemented by the PHOSITA’s knowledge and
abilities in determining whether an invention is obvious avoids these
problems.
But the gap-filling purpose of the PHOSITA does not hold for all
doctrines where it is used, or at least is not a strong enough rationale to
justify the costs imposed by the PHOSITA’s perspective. For example,
prior work suggests that claim construction should be evaluated from the
perspective of an “ordinary reader,” not the PHOSITA.197 The primary
justification for using the PHOSITA’s perspective in claim construction
is to ensure that the construction reflects the technical audience of patent
claims, not the judge’s own lay understanding.198 But it is doubtful the
PHOSITA’s perspective is necessary to achieve this purpose. The patent
document itself provides substantial information about the technical
context, and even a lay decision maker will use the provided technical
context in construing the claim,199 in the same way that an intelligent, but
not business-savvy, reader of the Wall Street Journal will use the context
provided to understand a complicated financial concept. The result is
likely to be a construction that approaches the technical meaning in the
194. Eisenberg, supra note 49, at 897–98.
195. ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY:
CASES AND MATERIALS 274 (6th ed. 2013).
196. Id. at 608–10.
197. See generally Greg Reilly, Judicial Capacities and Patent Claim Construction: An
Ordinary Reader Standard, 20 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 243 (2014) (depicting a full
analysis of the ordinary-reader standard).
198. Id. at 288.
199. Id. at 288–89.
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field, at least closely enough that the additional benefits the PHOSITA’s
perspective offers in terms of technical fidelity are outweighed by the
costs.
Similarly, the PHOSITA’s perspective is used in determining
anticipation (or novelty) and literal infringement,200 even though no gap
exists to be filled in those doctrines. Both doctrines ask whether the exact
same invention, with all its elements, is present, either in the prior art
(anticipation) or the accused product (literal infringement).201 It is not
clear why the PHOSITA’s perspective is necessary, at least in light of its
costs. Certainly, the judge must understand the disclosure of the prior art
(anticipation) or operation of the accused product (infringement), and
may require expert testimony to do so. But this will be limited to the
question of what the prior art actually says or how the accused product
actually operates, rather than more open-ended and subjective questions
about what the PHOSITA would implicitly know, understand, or be able
to do.
Thus, in areas of patent law where no gap exists between the question
at issue and the written record—like claim construction, literal
infringement, and anticipation—the use of the PHOSITA’s perspective
introduces more problems than it is probably worth.
3. Reigning in the PHOSITA
The choice is not between completely eliminating the PHOSITA in
favor of wholly legalistic doctrines or making patent law doctrines
completely dependent on the PHOSITA’s perspective. Rather, the
PHOSITA’s perspective can be calibrated to optimize the increased
fidelity to the technical merits it provides while minimizing the problems
of expert testimony that it introduces. Design choices about how to use
the PHOSITA in patent litigation have a substantial impact on the extent
of problems that it creates.
Efforts by the Supreme Court and commentators to increase reliance
on the PHOSITA in patent litigation range in the scope of the role, the
200. Holbrook, supra note 6, at 781. Infringement can also be found if the accused product is
the equivalent of the claimed invention, even if not exactly the same. Infringement by the doctrine
of equivalents thus involves a gap in the written record for which the PHOSITA’s perspective may
be appropriate.
201. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 195, at 344–45; American Intellectual Property Law
Association,
Model
Patent
Jury
Instructions,
Nos.
3.2,
6.0
(2015),
http://www.aipla.org/learningcenter/library/books/otherpubs/Documents/AIPLA%20Model%20Patent%20Jury%20Instructions%202015%20Final.docx
(noting the instructions for literal infringement).
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extent of the tasks, and the amount of “power” given to the PHOSITA.
At one extreme, the Supreme Court in Nautilus held that “a patent is
invalid for indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the specification
delineating the patent, and the prosecution history, fail to inform, with
reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the
invention.”202 Because the Supreme Court provided virtually no
guidance or constraint as to how to determine whether a PHOSITA would
find a claim reasonably certain,203 this leaves the doctrine extremely
dependent on the views of the PHOSITA, and therefore expert witnesses
offering their own opinions based on their subjective knowledge and
experience in the field.
KSR represents a less extreme, but still broad, delegation of “power”
to the PHOSITA.204 KSR undoubtedly indicated that courts should “pay
more attention than they have in the last quarter-century to who the
PHOSITA is and what he or she thinks” and that courts can rely more
broadly on the PHOSITA’s ingenuity and problem-solving ability.205
But KSR made “the background knowledge possessed by a person having
ordinary skill in the art” just one of the considerations in its multi-factor
approach along with other factors such as the “interrelated teachings of
multiple patents; [and] the effects of demands known to the design
community or present in the marketplace.”206 The need to consider these
other factors imposes some constraint on the PHOSITA’s perspective that
makes the PHOSITA less “powerful” under KSR than under Nautilus.
Teva provides an even more constrained role for the PHOSITA.207
The Court indicated it was appropriate for the “district court [to] resolve[]
a dispute between experts and make[] a factual finding that, in general, a
certain term of art had a particular meaning to a person of ordinary skill
in the art at the time of the invention.”208 If the Supreme Court had
stopped there, the scope of the PHOSITA’s role would look similarly
broad to Nautilus. Instead, the Court emphasized that “the district court
must then conduct a legal analysis: whether a skilled artisan would
202. Nautilus Inc. v. Biosig Instruments Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2123 (2014).
203. Greg Reilly, Completing the Picture of Uncertain Patent Scope, 91 WASH. U. L. REV.
1353, 1354 (2014).
204. KSR Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1742 (2007).
205. Durie & Lemley, supra note 48, at 1002.
206. Teleflex, 127 S. Ct. at 1740–41; Durie & Lemley, supra note 48, at 999 (“KSR is a bit of a
Rorschach test, offering language that can be twisted to support virtually any view of obviousness
law.”).
207. See Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 841 (2015).
208. Id.
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ascribe that same meaning to that term in the context of the specific patent
claim under review.”209 In this way, the context of the patent limits and
constrains the role of the PHOSITA—the Court’s claim construction
must be consistent not just with the PHOSITA’s understanding, but also
with the disclosure of the written patent document. At best, the
PHOSITA’s own understanding can set a baseline, or presumptive
meaning, that then can be rebutted by the information from the patent
document itself.210
Despite being one of the strongest proponents of increased use of the
PHOSITA in patent litigation, Professor Holbrook’s vision for the
PHOSITA’s role is even more limited than any of the Supreme Court
cases.211 Holbrook’s proposal is to use presumptions that “prefer[]
reliance on the patent document and public record over extrinsic,
technological evidence” but that “can be rebutted by persuasive
technology-based evidence.”212 A legalistic inquiry, such as parsing the
patent document itself, would set the default position, and consideration
of extrinsic evidence of the PHOSITA’s knowledge, skills, or perspective
would be limited to overcoming the presumption set by the legalistic
inquiry.213 This narrows the role of the PHOSITA and limits the
PHOSITA’s impact, thereby minimizing the problems created by expert
witnesses. Indeed, Holbrook notes that one benefit of his approach is that
it could “act as a counterbalance to overreliance on expert testimony, one
risk when laypersons encounter technical information.”214
The problems with expert witnesses introduced by reliance on the
PHOSITA’s perspective suggest that patent law doctrines relying on the
PHOSITA should be designed more in line with the Holbrook or Teva
end of the spectrum than with the Nautilus or KSR end. Reducing the
role of the PHOSITA and providing checks or constraints on the
PHOSITA’s perspective minimize the problems created when lay
decision makers rely on expert witnesses to obtain information about the
PHOSITA’s perspective.

209. Id.
210. See Rantanen, supra note 59, at 392 (reading Teva as adopting a factual approach to
“starting meaning . . . . where the judge begins by making a factual determination about the meaning
of a claim term to a person of skill in the art” and only then looks to intrinsic evidence in reaching
a final meaning).
211. Holbrook, supra note 6, at 783.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 819–25.
214. Id. at 815.
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4. Increasing the Objectivity of Patent Law
Among the most troublesome types of expert evidence is subjective
opinion based on knowledge, training, and experience that lacks an
objective foundation—a common type of expert testimony in patent
cases.215 Ironically, the PHOSITA perspective is justified as “plac[ing]
the standard for patentability on a legally objective, rather than
subjective, footing” because it does not depend on the actual abilities of
the inventor or any other person.216 But the PHOSITA perspective enters
patent litigation based on the testimony of expert witnesses, who are often
testifying based primarily, or exclusively, on their own subjective views
developed based on their own knowledge, experience, and training.217
An obvious design choice to minimize the problems the PHOSITA
perspective creates for lay decision makers is to increase the objectivity
of patent law doctrines, making them more dependent on an objectively
verifiable foundation and less dependent on the background knowledge
and experience of the PHOSITA (and therefore, expert witnesses).
Increasing the objective foundation of patent law has two principle effects
for the problems addressed in this Article. First, it helps mitigate
adversarial bias by constraining the opinions that can be offered. Expert
witnesses cannot provide open-ended opinions that simply cite their own
training and experience and essentially tell the lay decision maker to
“trust me.” Rather, they must reconcile their opinions with the objective
foundation, limiting the range of opinions that can be offered.
Second, it helps mitigate the problems lay judges have evaluating
expert testimony. Judges do not need to have their own experience in the
technical field, or develop their own understanding of the knowledge in
the field, to evaluate the expert testimony or resolve conflicts between
experts. Nor are they left to decide based on secondary criteria like
demeanor and testifying ability. Instead, judges can check the expert
testimony against the objective foundation. By no means does this
resolve the problems of lay decision makers evaluating expert evidence.
The judge may have an imperfect understanding of the objective
foundation or make an incorrect determination about how the expert
evidence compares to the objective foundation. The claim is only
relative. Compared to subjective expert testimony based on knowledge,
215. See supra Part II.B.2 (explaining how expert testimony that applies subjective criteria
when objective criteria is lacking creates problems for laypeople attempting to understand
particular subject matters).
216. Burk & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1188.
217. See supra Part II.B.2 (describing how experts apply subjective criteria based on their own
training and experiences).
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training, and experience—which completely lacks any means for the
judge to evaluate other than secondary criteria—an objective foundation
at least provides some means for evaluation, even if imperfect.
The obviousness doctrine pre- and post-KSR offers a good example.
Commentators have criticized the pre-KSR Federal Circuit for treating the
PHOSITA “as a bit of a ‘dullard,’ aware of the art but devoid of creativity
or inventive skills.”218 Courts only looked to PHOSITA to determine
how the PHOSITA would read the prior art references, instead of what
the PHOSITA would know or do.219 This approach was criticized
because it prevented reliance on “the judgment, intuition and tacit
knowledge of ordinary practitioners in the field that cannot be
documented in the written record.”220
To the contrary, this Article suggests that this result was exactly the
benefit of the Federal Circuit’s approach. To determine in litigation the
“judgment, intuition and tacit knowledge of ordinary practitioners in the
field that cannot be documented in the written record,”221 necessarily
requires subjective expert testimony based just on knowledge,
experience, and training—among the most problematic forms of expert
testimony. By contrast, limiting the PHOSITA’s perspective to
determining what the prior art references disclosed and suggested
provided an objective foundation for the expert testimony—the texts of
the prior art references themselves. Even if lay judges did not perfectly
understand the prior art references, they at least had something to which
to compare the experts’ testimony. And there was some restraint on what
an expert could say.
By focusing more on the PHOSITA’s background knowledge,
ingenuity, and capabilities, KSR made obviousness a less objective
doctrine that depended more on the subjective testimony of expert
witnesses.222 Over a century of writing on expert witnesses suggests this
was a bad choice.223
CONCLUSION
The trend toward greater reliance on the PHOSITA in patent litigation
is superficially appealing. Patent litigation is an inherently technical
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
cases).

Durie & Lemley, supra note 48, at 1001.
Eisenberg, supra note 49, at 889.
Id. at 888.
Id.
Durie & Lemley, supra note 48, at 999–1004.
See supra Part II (detailing the problems of reliance on expert testimony in litigating patent
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subject, and fidelity or accuracy to the technical aspects seems like an
important objective. Yet, technical fidelity is an unachievable first-best
outcome in light of the lay decision makers in patent litigation. Trying to
approximate this first-best outcome as closely as possible through the use
of the PHOSITA introduces a host of well-recognized problems for lay
decision makers related to expert witnesses. A second-best approach that
tailors patent doctrines to the needs of lay decision makers is preferable
in practice, even if not ideal in theory.

